Suspicious Kubernetes Permission Enumeration via kubectl auth can-i

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-16
Updated
2026-10-16

ATT&CK techniques

Discovery
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects use of kubectl to enumerate the caller permissions in a cluster by listing all allowed actions, a post-compromise reconnaissance step observed in real-world Kubernetes intrusions after remote code execution in a pod. Attackers use this to map the reach of a stolen service-account token before attempting privilege escalation or lateral movement.

Related detections8 linkedT1613 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Kubernetes SelfSubjectAccessReview Permission Enumeration
Malicious Kubernetes Reconnaissance Tooling Activity
Suspicious Container Environment Reconnaissance in Serverless Build
Suspicious Kubernetes Secret Enumeration via kubectl
Suspicious Kubernetes API Request From Anonymous User
Suspicious Kubernetes Secret and Permission Enumeration via kubectl (via process_creation)
Suspicious Anonymous Access to Kubernetes API Server via Audit Log
Kubernetes audit log signals potential tool and shell enumeration/execution activity
Suspicious Kubernetes Permission Enumeration via kubectl auth can-i
Pivot detection · T1613 · 8 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.