Suspicious Kubernetes Pod Deployment with Privileged or Host Namespace Flags

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-16
Updated
2026-10-16

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects on-the-fly creation of Kubernetes pods running tooling such as busybox or socat with privileged, host-PID or host-path options, a container-escape and pivot technique seen in real-world cluster attacks. Launching a privileged pod that mounts the node filesystem lets an attacker break out of the container onto the underlying host.

Related detections9 linkedT1611 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Privileged or Host Namespace Kubernetes Pod Creation
Malicious Container Escape via Privileged Docker Host PID Namespace
Malicious Privileged Container Creation in Kubernetes (via audit)
Malicious Docker Socket Access via Curl Unix Socket
Suspicious Cgroup release_agent Abuse for Container Escape
Suspicious Privileged Docker Container Launch With Host chroot
Malicious Direct etcd Write to Kubernetes Registry via ETCDCTL_API (via process_creation)
Malicious Docker Client Targeting Remote Exposed 2375 API
Suspicious Shell Execution Into Kubernetes Pod via API
Suspicious Kubernetes Pod Deployment with Privileged or Host Namespace Flags
Pivot detection · T1611 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.