Suspicious LDAP Security Descriptor Enumeration via SD_FLAGS Control

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Service
security
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-01
Updated
2026-10-01

ATT&CK techniques

Discovery
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Directory Service event 1644 queries that combine the LDAP_SERVER_SD_FLAGS_OID control 1.2.840.113556.1.4.801 with retrieval of the nTSecurityDescriptor attribute, the mass access-control enumeration performed by BloodHound style tooling. Reading security descriptors across many objects maps attack paths and delegation abuse opportunities in Active Directory. Broad SD_FLAGS-driven descriptor collection is characteristic of reconnaissance rather than routine administration.

Related detections9 linkedT1069.002 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious SOAPHound Style LDAP Query with SDflags and all_with_list via security
Suspicious SOAPHound Null Filter LDAP Query via security
Suspicious Delegation Discovery LDAP Search Filter via Bitwise OID
Suspicious Service Principal Name Discovery via setspn Query
Malicious Active Directory Enumeration via SharpHound or BloodHound (via process_creation)
Suspicious Group Discovery - Command (via process_creation)
SharpHound Host Enumeration Over Kerberos (via security)
Suspicious Active Directory Enumeration via ADWS PowerShell Cmdlets via ps_script
Windows File Events: ADExplorer .dat Snapshot Written by ADExp.exe or ADExplorer.exe
Suspicious LDAP Security Descriptor Enumeration via SD_FLAGS Control
Pivot detection · T1069.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.