Suspicious Local Account Creation and Privileged Group Addition via Net.EXE (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-30
Updated
2026-08-30

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of a local user account or addition of an account to a privileged local group through net.exe or net1.exe. Account manipulation for persistence and privilege escalation features in the Red Canary Threat Detection Report, letting adversaries establish durable, legitimate-looking access. Detecting local account and administrators-group changes at the command line surfaces backdoor-account activity.

Related detections9 linkedT1098 — drag to rearrange
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Suspicious Local Account Creation and Privileged Group Addition via Net.EXE (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1098 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.