Suspicious Local Account Creation Named DefaultService

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-28
Updated
2026-09-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of a local account named DefaultService via net user /add, a masquerade used by the actor to blend a backdoor account with service naming conventions. New local accounts with deceptive service-like names during an intrusion indicate persistence and should be investigated immediately.

Related detections9 linkedT1136.001 — drag to rearrange
ScreenConnect Administrator Provisioning XML Written to Temp Directory (CWE-288)
Suspicious Rogue VeeamBkp Account Creation by Estate Ransomware
Malicious Account Added to Domain Admins via net localgroup
Suspicious Miner Operator Account Creation Named samsungmid
Suspicious Local Account Creation Matching Hunters International Naming
Suspicious Rogue Administrator Account Creation Named System32 (via process_creation)
Suspicious Local Account Creation via Net User in Pre-Ransomware Phase
Suspicious Hidden Local Account Creation via Net User by UAT-8099
Malicious Local Account Creation of Support or Whiteninja via net.exe
Suspicious Local Account Creation Named DefaultService
Pivot detection · T1136.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.