Suspicious Local Account Creation of DefaultService via Net User

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1136.001Local Account
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of a local account named DefaultService using net user, a persistence step observed in the ClickFix to Matanbuchus to AstarionRAT intrusion where the actor added a service-like account to blend in. The innocuous DefaultService name is chosen to evade casual review of local accounts. New account creation with this masquerading name is a strong indicator of attacker persistence.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1136.001 — drag to rearrange

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Malicious Account Added to Domain Admins via net localgroup

Suspicious Miner Operator Account Creation Named samsungmid

Suspicious Local Account Creation Matching Hunters International Naming

Suspicious Rogue Administrator Account Creation Named System32 (via process_creation)

Suspicious Local Account Creation of DefaultService via Net User

Pivot detection · T1136.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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