Suspicious Local Password Validation via dscl authonly

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
- T1555.003Credentials from Web Browsers
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects dscl used with authonly to validate a local account password, the step Banshee performs to verify credentials captured through its fake prompt. This directory service call confirms a phished password before further theft. Detecting it surfaces credential validation by the stealer.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious Local Password Validation via dscl authonly

Pivot detection · T1555.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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