Suspicious LSASS Memory Dump via Renamed ProcDump (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-03
Updated
2026-10-03

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a ProcDump-style full memory dump of the lsass process regardless of the binary name on disk. The BadPilot campaign renames procdump and invokes it with the full-dump and accept-eula switches against lsass to harvest credentials, so this command-line pattern captures the technique even when the tool is renamed.

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Suspicious LSASS Memory Dump via Renamed ProcDump (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1003.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.