Suspicious M365 Sign-In from Synthetic iPhone User Agent via m365

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
m365
Service
signinlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-28
Updated
2026-09-28

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion → Lateral Movement
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Microsoft 365 sign-ins presenting a synthetic iPhone user agent string carrying an implausible Version/26 token. Operators in the Railway PaaS token replay campaign forged iOS user agents when replaying stolen tokens, so this crafted device string is an indicator of non-genuine client access to the tenant.

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Suspicious M365 Sign-In from Synthetic iPhone User Agent via m365
Pivot detection · T1550.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.