Suspicious M365 Sign-In With axios Automation User-Agent (via azure)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
azure
Service
signinlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-15
Updated
2026-10-15

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Cred Access

  5. Discovery

  6. Lateral Movement

  7. Collection

  8. C2

  9. Exfiltration

  10. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Azure AD sign-in activity presenting an axios HTTP client user-agent, observed during adversary-in-the-middle session token phishing against M365. Legitimate interactive users do not sign in with the axios library user-agent. Automated access with stolen session tokens indicates account takeover and mailbox abuse.

Related detections9 linkedT1078.004 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Legacy Authentication via BAV2ROPC User Agent (via m365)
Suspicious Salesforce Data Access via Spoofed Automation User-Agents
Suspicious Okta Application Self-Assignment to All Applications by UNC3944 (via cloud)
Suspicious Help Desk Impersonation via External Microsoft Teams Chat
Suspicious Salesforce Connected App OAuth Authorization from VPN Egress
Suspicious Entra ID Password Spraying via ROPC Grant to Azure CLI App
Suspicious Entra ROPC Password Spray Against Azure CLI Client
Malicious Consent to Known Traitorware Mail Clients via Azure AD
Suspicious OAuth Device Code Sign-In to Authentication Broker via Tycoon 2FA
Suspicious M365 Sign-In With axios Automation User-Agent (via azure)
Pivot detection · T1078.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.