Suspicious macOS ClickFix Execution Piping curl to zsh via UNC1069

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
macos
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-13
Updated
2026-10-13

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a shell command that downloads content with curl and pipes it directly into zsh as used by UNC1069 macOS ClickFix social engineering. Attackers execute remote script content in memory to install a WebSocket based backdoor without writing the stager to disk.

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Suspicious macOS ClickFix Execution Piping curl to zsh via UNC1069
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.