Suspicious macOS LaunchAgent or LaunchDaemon Plist Creation

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
macos
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-08
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of a property list file inside the macOS LaunchAgents or LaunchDaemons directories. It maps to persistence where an attacker drops a launchd job configured with RunAtLoad and a short StartInterval to repeatedly execute a hidden payload from a temp path. Detecting new plists in these directories surfaces launchd persistence installation.

Related detections9 linkedT1543.001 — drag to rearrange
LaunchAgent or LaunchDaemon Persistence File Creation on macOS (via file_event)
Malicious Mini Shai-Hulud gh-token-monitor Persistence Service (via file_event)
macOS launchctl Execution of Launch Agent/Daemon
macOS Persistence Attempt Using PlistBuddy to Modify LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons
Suspicious Persistence Load via Launchctl (via process_creation)
Masquerading Cuckoo Stealer LaunchAgent Masquerading as Homebrew Updater (via file_event)
Suspicious LaunchAgent Masquerading as coreaudiod (via file_event)
Suspicious LaunchAgent or LaunchDaemon Load via launchctl
Malicious macOS LaunchDaemon Persistence Masquerading as Finder Helper
Suspicious macOS LaunchAgent or LaunchDaemon Plist Creation
Pivot detection · T1543.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.