Suspicious macOS Local Credential Validation via dscl authonly

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
- T1110.003Password Spraying
- T1552.004Private Keys
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects use of the Directory Service command line tool dscl with the authonly option to validate a local account password without producing a login session. The MacSync stealer described by Huntress used this technique to confirm harvested credentials and to brute force the local user password. Legitimate use is rare, so scripted or non-interactive invocations should be treated as credential-access activity.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1552.004 — drag to rearrange

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Suspicious macOS Local Credential Validation via dscl authonly

Pivot detection · T1552.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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