Suspicious Malicious WAR Deployment via GlassFish Admin Console

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
webserver
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-17
Updated
2026-10-17

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects requests referencing a cmd.war archive against the GlassFish server, the web-shell deployment step performed after the administration console authentication bypass to gain command execution. Deployment of an attacker WAR named cmd.war is a strong indicator of post-exploitation web shell installation.

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Suspicious Malicious WAR Deployment via GlassFish Admin Console
Pivot detection · T1505.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.