Suspicious Member Added to Privileged Directory Role in Entra ID

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
azure
Service
auditlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-04
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Entra ID audit events adding a member to a directory role such as Global Administrator. Wiz Research observed Midnight Blizzard elevating principals into privileged roles to broaden access, so unexpected role membership changes can indicate an account manipulation and privilege escalation attempt.

Related detections9 linkedT1098.003 — drag to rearrange
Malicious Assignment of a Privileged Azure AD Role (via auditlogs)
Suspicious Entra Cross-Tenant Access or External User Invitation via Azure Audit (via azure)
Suspicious Delegated Permission Grant to Entra Agent Access Scope via Azure Audit Logs
Suspicious IAM CreateLoginProfile For Root User via AWS AssumeRoot Abuse
Suspicious AWS IAM Privilege Escalation via AttachUserPolicy of Administrator Policy
Suspicious High-Privilege Microsoft Graph Application Role Grant via Azure Audit (via azure)
GCP Google Workspace: Application ContextAwareAccess Setting Changed
GitHub Audit: Outside Collaborator Membership and Permission Changes
Azure Audit Logs: Admin-initiated App Role Assignments and Privileged Delegated Permissions
Suspicious Member Added to Privileged Directory Role in Entra ID
Pivot detection · T1098.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.