Suspicious Microsoft 365 OAuth Authorization to Visual Studio Code Client

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
azure
Service
signinlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-02
Updated
2026-11-02

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects sign-ins authorizing the Visual Studio Code first-party OAuth client which Russian threat actors abused in OAuth phishing to capture authorization codes and access Microsoft 365 accounts. The attack lured victims to approve the insiders.vscode.dev redirect and hand over tokens. Anomalous consent to this client can indicate targeted token theft.

Related detections9 linkedT1528 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Token Request Using Microsoft Authentication Broker Client to Obtain Primary Refresh Token (via azure)
Suspicious Microsoft Entra Device Code Authentication Flow
Suspicious Google Workspace OAuth Authorization for Chrome Web Store Scope via Token Audit
Suspicious OAuth Application Consent Grant via Azure Audit Logs
Possible Rogue Device Registration in Entra ID (via azure)
Suspicious OAuth Application Consent Granted High Privilege Mail Scopes (via m365)
Suspicious Azure Tenant Root Elevation via elevateAccess
Suspicious Salesforce Connected App OAuth Authorization from VPN Egress
Suspicious M365 Device Code Authentication Flow via m365
Suspicious Microsoft 365 OAuth Authorization to Visual Studio Code Client
Pivot detection · T1528 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.