Suspicious Microsoft Edge Headless Launch with Unpacked Extension via SNOWBELT (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-13
Updated
2026-10-13

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Microsoft Edge started in headless mode while side-loading an unpacked extension from disk, the technique UNC6692 used to run the SNOWBELT browser extension during the Snow Flurries social engineering campaign. Adversaries abuse headless browser automation with loaded extensions to access and proxy data while blending into normal browser activity, so this launch pattern warrants investigation.

Related detections9 linkedT1176 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Browser Extension Force-Install via Registry (via registry_set)
Suspicious Microsoft Edge Native Messaging Host Registration via UNC6692
Malicious Madgicx Plus Chrome Extension Identifiers on Disk
Suspicious Browser Extension Sideload From a User Path (via process_creation)
Suspicious Chrome Remote Debugging Port for Browser Session Theft
Suspicious Microsoft Edge Unpacked Extension Load via UNC6692 Edgecution
Malicious Chrome Extension Sideload via --load-extension from User-Writable Path (via process_creation)
Suspicious Edgecution Malicious Extension Load via Headless Edge (via process_creation)
Malicious Chrome Relaunch Hijack by FlutterShell Backdoor on macOS (via process_creation)
Suspicious Microsoft Edge Headless Launch with Unpacked Extension via SNOWBELT (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1176 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.