Suspicious More_eggs ie4uinit Copy to AppData Microsoft Folder

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-21
Updated
2026-09-21

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the signed ie4uinit binary being executed from a user AppData Microsoft folder rather than System32. More_eggs fake job applicant lures copy ie4uinit alongside an attacker written ieuinit inf to abuse its inf handling. Running the LOLBIN from the wrong path enables execution of attacker controlled directives under a trusted name.

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Suspicious More_eggs ie4uinit Copy to AppData Microsoft Folder
Pivot detection · T1218 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.