Suspicious MoustachedBouncer Command Execution from SMB EDGEIN Directory via Cmd (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-11
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects cmd.exe reading operator commands from the SMB share directory EDGEIN, the command channel used by the MoustachedBouncer SharpDisco backdoor to pipe attacker input into a shell. This behavior indicates remote command-and-control tasking through a network share.

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Suspicious MoustachedBouncer Command Execution from SMB EDGEIN Directory via Cmd (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1059.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.