Suspicious MQTT Command and Control Connection by WikiLoader

PremiumReviewedSigma · Low · v1
Category
network_connection
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-19
Updated
2026-10-19

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects outbound network connections to MQTT broker ports used by a unique WikiLoader variant for command and control after a spoofed GlobalProtect infection. Repurposing the MQTT messaging protocol provides a resilient channel that many defenses do not inspect. Detecting connections on these ports from endpoints exposes potential WikiLoader beaconing.

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Possible FluBot C2 Polling via Known Malware URI Paths
Malicious MetaStealer C2 via cpp-httplib User-Agent (via proxy)
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Suspicious MQTT Command and Control Connection by WikiLoader
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.