Suspicious MSBuild Execution of MSHI Metafile via cmd (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-09
Updated
2026-10-09

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects cmd.exe launching msbuild with a metafile that has an mshi extension a loader pattern used by the PipeMagic backdoor. PipeMagic was seen in RansomExx activity and in exploitation of the CVE-2025-29824 privilege escalation. Abusing the trusted MSBuild binary to compile and run an inline task lets the operator execute code while evading application controls.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.