Suspicious MSBuild Execution Spawned by Interactive Shell for Code Proxying (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-30
Updated
2026-10-30

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the developer utility MSBuild being launched by an interactive shell or scripting host rather than a build toolchain, the trusted-binary abuse in this multi-gang intrusion where MSBuild was used to proxy SectopRAT execution. Adversaries run MSBuild to compile and execute inline C sharp payloads under a signed Microsoft binary, so MSBuild parented by cmd powershell or explorer on a non-developer host is a code-execution indicator that can be filtered on build servers.

Related detections9 linkedT1127.001 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious MSBuild Spawned by PowerShell (via process_creation)
Suspicious MSBuild Execution of Project File from ProgramData (via process_creation)
Malicious MSBuild Execution of Downloaded csproj Project File (via process_creation)
Suspicious MSBuild Inline Task Compilation of mini.xml
Suspicious MSBuild Execution Spawned by Command Shell for Process Hollowing (via process_creation)
Suspicious MSBuild Execution of Inline Payload (via process_creation)
Suspicious MSBuild Execution as LOLBin from User-Writable Path (via process_creation)
Suspicious Local XML Compilation via MSBuild
Malicious Winlogon Shell Hijack Loading MSBuild
Suspicious MSBuild Execution Spawned by Interactive Shell for Code Proxying (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1127.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.