Suspicious Mshta Executed From Non-System Path (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-17
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the mshta binary running from a location outside System32 which the CarnavalHeist trojan uses after copying mshta to a randomly named file to evade signature and path based detection. A renamed or relocated trusted LOLBin executing user content is a strong masquerading and signed proxy execution signal.

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Suspicious Remote HTA Payload Execution via MSHTA
Malicious Shell Spawned by Mshta Delivery (via process_creation)
Malicious Kimsuky Remote HTA Execution via URL Shortener (via process_creation)
ClickFix Paste-Jacking Execution of mshta Retrieving Remote Payload (via process_creation)
Suspicious mshta Execution of Remote HTA Payload
Malicious Forfiles Proxy Execution Launching PowerShell and MSHTA in PEAKLIGHT Chain (via process_creation)
Malicious mshta.exe Spawning bitsadmin via ClickFix Phantom Meet
Suspicious Mshta Execution of Remote Payload from Explorer via ClickFix Lure (via process_creation)
Suspicious Mshta Executed From Non-System Path (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1218.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.