Suspicious Mshta Executed From Non-System Path (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-17
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the mshta binary running from a location outside System32 which the CarnavalHeist trojan uses after copying mshta to a randomly named file to evade signature and path based detection. A renamed or relocated trusted LOLBin executing user content is a strong masquerading and signed proxy execution signal.

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Suspicious Mshta Executed From Non-System Path (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1218.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.