Suspicious msinfo32.exe Executed From ViPNet Update Directory

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-09
Updated
2026-10-09

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects msinfo32.exe running from a ViPNet update temporary directory instead of the System32 path indicating a malicious loader planted under a trusted filename. This masquerade is used by a backdoor delivered as fake ViPNet software updates to load the next stage while blending in with legitimate update activity. The wrong-path plus trusted-name combination is a strong sideloading signal.

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Suspicious msinfo32.exe Executed From ViPNet Update Directory
Pivot detection · T1036.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.