Suspicious Named Pipe Access for Authentication Coercion (via pipe_created)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
pipe_created
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-19
Updated
2026-10-19

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access → Collection
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects access to the RPC named pipes abused by authentication coercion techniques such as PetitPotam and PrinterBug to force a target into authenticating to an attacker-controlled server. The spoolss, efsrpc, and eventlog pipes expose dangerous opnums that trigger outbound NTLM authentication. Detecting connections to these pipes surfaces coercion attempts that feed NTLM relay and privilege escalation.

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Suspicious LLMNR and NBT-NS Poisoning Tooling via ALPHA SPIDER (via process_creation)
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Suspicious Named Pipe Access for Authentication Coercion (via pipe_created)
Pivot detection · T1187 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.