Suspicious Named Pipe Created by Kazuar Backdoor for Interprocess Command Channel

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1559.001Component Object Model
Persistence
Priv Esc
- T1055Process Injection
Defense Evasion
- T1055Process Injection
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of named pipes whose names end in the Kazuar command channel suffixes PING, TASK or LOGS used by the Pensive Ursa (Turla) backdoor to coordinate injected components. Kazuar derives the pipe prefix from the machine GUID and appends fixed command keywords which reveals its interprocess control mechanism after injection into explorer.exe or svchost.exe.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious Named Pipe Created by Kazuar Backdoor for Interprocess Command Channel

Pivot detection · T1055 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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