Suspicious .NET Utility Launched as Process Injection Target (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-21
Updated
2026-09-21

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects MSBuild.exe or RegAsm.exe running without any project, solution or assembly argument, the state in which FakeBat IDAT loader and Payk RunPE hollow these signed .NET utilities to host SectopRAT. Legitimate invocations reference a build file or assembly, so argument-less execution indicates process hollowing. This is the injection stage of Google Ads malvertising via MSIX.

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Suspicious DotNet Utility Spawned by Script Host for Process Hollowing via Command Line
Suspicious Outbound Network Connection from msiexec.exe (via network_connection)
Suspicious Outbound Connection from tracerpt.exe after Process Hollowing (via network_connection)
Suspicious AddInProcess32 Outbound Connection after Process Hollowing
Suspicious microsoftedgeupdatecore Outbound Connection from Wrong Path
Suspicious RegAsm or AppLaunch Outbound Connection after Injection
Suspicious .NET Utility Launched as Process Injection Target (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1055.012 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.