Suspicious netsh Outbound Network Connection from IDAT Loader Injection

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → C2

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
- T1055Process Injection
Defense Evasion
- T1055Process Injection
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
- T1071.001Web Protocols
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the netsh utility initiating outbound internet connections which is abnormal for the tool. A fake IT support site leading to Vidar used the Hijack IDAT Loader to inject shellcode into netsh so C2 traffic runs from a signed process. netsh has no legitimate reason to reach external hosts so this points to process injection.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1071.001 — drag to rearrange

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Suspicious netsh Outbound Network Connection from IDAT Loader Injection

Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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