Suspicious NetSupport Manager Remote Client Execution (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-14
Updated
2026-10-14

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of the NetSupport Manager remote-control client32.exe, the remote access tool dropped as the final payload of the GitHub-hosted info stealer chain in this malvertising campaign. Adversaries repurpose the legitimate NetSupport client as a covert RAT for hands-on-keyboard control, so client32.exe running in an environment without a sanctioned NetSupport deployment indicates remote-access compromise.

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Suspicious NetSupport Manager Remote Client Execution (via process_creation)
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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.