Suspicious Network Connection From CUPS Foomatic-Rip Child Process

ATT&CK techniques

Execution

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1203Exploitation for Client Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects an outbound network connection initiated by a child of the foomatic-rip print filter which indicates post-exploitation activity following abuse of the CUPS printing vulnerability. Adversaries who gain execution through the print filter reach out to command and control or download additional tooling from the compromised host.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious Network Connection From CUPS Foomatic-Rip Child Process

Pivot detection · T1203 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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