Suspicious New MFA Authenticator Registration via Azure AD (via azure)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
azure
Service
auditlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-18
Updated
2026-10-18

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Discovery

  5. Lateral Movement

  6. Collection

  7. C2

  8. Exfiltration

  9. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects registration of new security information such as a Microsoft Authenticator app on an Azure AD identity, a persistence and MFA-bypass step used in the Jingle Thief campaign. The actors register a rogue authenticator to maintain access to compromised accounts. Detecting this registration surfaces attacker enrollment of unauthorized MFA methods after account takeover.

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Suspicious New MFA Authenticator Registration via Azure AD (via azure)
Pivot detection · T1556 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.