Suspicious NimDoor Exfiltration Staging Directory Creation via uplex Prefix (via file_event)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
macos
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-27
Updated
2026-10-27

ATT&CK techniques

Collection
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects NimDoor staging stolen browser and credential data into a temporary directory whose path begins with the uplex prefix under private var tmp. The directory holds harvested data before exfiltration over the C2 channel. This distinctive staging path is not produced by legitimate macOS software.

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Pivot detection · T1074.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.