Suspicious node.exe or code.exe Execution from Public Music Directory

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-28
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects node.exe or code.exe running from the C:\Users\Public\Music directory, where ChaosBot staged a FRP tunneling client and a downloaded VS Code binary. Legitimate Node.js and VS Code do not execute from a Public media folder, so this path indicates staged tooling for tunneling and command execution. The wrong-path execution of dual-use binaries reveals attacker infrastructure on the host.

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Suspicious node.exe or code.exe Execution from Public Music Directory
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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.