Suspicious node Execution of sync.js from NodeJS Masquerade Directory

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-08
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects node running a sync.js payload from a NodeJS named directory used as a masquerade staging location in the AsyncAPI npm supply chain compromise. Executing a sync.js loader from a fake NodeJS folder is the import-time payload delivery step that pulls the second stage from the attacker C2.

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Suspicious node Execution of sync.js from NodeJS Masquerade Directory
Pivot detection · T1059.007 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.