Suspicious Node.js Execution from User AppData Directory (via process_creation)

ATT&CK techniques

Execution

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059.007JavaScript
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the Node.js interpreter running from a user AppData Local path, a location TA584 used to execute the Tsundere bot outside standard install directories. Legitimate Electron applications can also run node from AppData so tune to environment.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious Node.js Execution from User AppData Directory (via process_creation)

Pivot detection · T1059.007 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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