Suspicious npm Postinstall Node Execution From Fixtures Path (BeaverTail OtterCookie)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-11
Updated
2026-09-11

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Execution
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Persistence

  4. Priv Esc

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects node.exe executing a script from a test fixtures eval path, the malicious npm postinstall chain used by the BeaverTail and OtterCookie malware families delivered through compromised packages. This lures developers into running staged JavaScript modules such as index.js and file15.js. Node execution from fixture directories during package installation indicates a supply-chain compromise.

Related detections9 linkedT1059.007 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious NPM Install Hook Executing Setup Script via Node
Malicious Bun Runtime Payload Dropped by Shai Hulud npm Supply Chain Attack
Malicious Shai-Hulud Bun Payload Execution via npm Preinstall Script (via process_creation)
Malicious Shai-Hulud npm Payload Execution via bun_environment Script (via process_creation)
Linux File Creation Indicators for TanStack Runner and Persistence Components
Windows TanStack Supply-Chain File Creation Indicators via router_init.js and router_runtime.js
Suspicious Node Payload Drop in Local Share Directory (via file_event)
Suspicious Script Host Execution of Decoy-Named JavaScript Dropper (PS1Bot)
Malicious Emmenhtal JavaScript Loader Spawning Encoded PowerShell
Suspicious npm Postinstall Node Execution From Fixtures Path (BeaverTail OtterCookie)
Pivot detection · T1059.007 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.