Suspicious NW.js Runtime Execution from AppData Roaming by Charcoal Stork (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-24
Updated
2026-10-24

ATT&CK techniques

Execution
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the NW.js runtime nw.exe executing from the AppData Roaming directory, the Charcoal Stork behavior Red Canary documented for delivering Yellow Cockatoo and related payloads. Legitimate NW.js applications install under Program Files, so execution from a user roaming profile indicates a bundled malicious NW.js package.

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Suspicious NW.js Runtime Execution from AppData Roaming by Charcoal Stork (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1059.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.