Suspicious OAuth Application Consent in Microsoft Entra

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
azure
Service
auditlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-14
Updated
2026-09-14

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a Consent to application event in Microsoft Entra which the CoPhish technique relies on to trick a user into granting a malicious Copilot Studio hosted OAuth application access to their tokens for account takeover.

Related detections9 linkedT1528 — drag to rearrange
Malicious OAuth Application Granted Full Mailbox and EWS Permissions (via m365)
Suspicious GAM OAuth Token Enumeration via Process Creation
Suspicious Entra ID Device Code Flow Authentication
Suspicious Delegated Permission Grant to Entra Agent Access Scope via Azure Audit Logs
Suspicious OAuth Application Registration with Localhost Reply URL via Azure AD
Malicious PRT Token Forging via AADInternals (via ps_script)
Possible VMware Workspace ONE SSRF via instanceHealth hostName At-Injection (via webserver)
Suspicious Entra Device Code Authentication with Office Client and Automated User Agent
Suspicious Access to Kubernetes Service Account Token via Curl or Wget (via process_creation)
Suspicious OAuth Application Consent in Microsoft Entra
Pivot detection · T1528 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.