Suspicious OAuth Sign-In Using Visual Studio Code Client and Auth Broker

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Cred Access

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
- T1566Phishing
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
- T1528Steal Application Access Token
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Entra ID non-interactive sign-ins where the Visual Studio Code first-party application requests a token through the Microsoft Authentication Broker resource, the exact combination abused in an OAuth phishing campaign. Attackers lure victims into authorizing this trusted client to mint refresh tokens and register rogue devices for persistent access to Microsoft Graph.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1528 — drag to rearrange

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Suspicious OAuth Sign-In Using Visual Studio Code Client and Auth Broker

Pivot detection · T1528 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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