Suspicious Office Application Spawning Interpreter via DDEAUTO (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-19
Updated
2026-09-19

ATT&CK techniques

Execution
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Microsoft Office applications spawning command shells or scripting interpreters, the hallmark of Dynamic Data Exchange DDEAUTO field abuse for code execution. Observed in Elastic Security Labs root cause analysis where winword.exe launches mshta, powershell, or cmd from a weaponized document to run attacker payloads.

Related detections9 linkedT1204.002 — drag to rearrange
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Malicious Office Application Loading a User-Path DLL via Regsvr32 or Rundll32 (via process_creation)
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Suspicious Office Application Spawning Interpreter via DDEAUTO (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1204.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.