Suspicious Office Application Spawning Script Or Shell Interpreter

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-10
Updated
2026-09-10

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a Microsoft Office application spawning a command shell or scripting interpreter. MacroPack-generated maldocs used VBA to launch child interpreters that injected and executed offensive-tool loaders such as Havoc and Brute Ratel. Office applications spawning cmd powershell wscript or rundll32 is a strong macro-abuse signal for the initial execution stage of an intrusion.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.