Suspicious OneDrive Masquerading TLB Marker File in ProgramData

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1036Masquerading
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the creation of a file named MicrosoftOneDrive.tlb directly in the ProgramData root. HoneyMyte used this file as an infection marker while masquerading as a legitimate OneDrive component as reported by Kaspersky. A type library file impersonating OneDrive at this location indicates implant staging and masquerading.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious OneDrive Masquerading TLB Marker File in ProgramData

Pivot detection · T1036 · 9 related

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