Suspicious osascript LaunchAgent Plist Persistence for PhantomPulse on macOS

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
macos
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-19
Updated
2026-09-19

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects osascript writing a LaunchAgent property list to establish persistence as used by the macOS PhantomPulse RAT variant in Elastic research. Using AppleScript to drop a plist under LaunchAgents lets the implant execute automatically at login while avoiding direct file tooling.

Related detections9 linkedT1543.001 — drag to rearrange
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Malicious NimDoor Loader Persistence via Masqueraded Google Updater (via file_event)
Malicious XCSSET Payload Drop to Temp and Hidden Home Paths
Suspicious Safari-Masquerading LaunchAgent Loaded via launchctl on macOS
Malicious macOS LaunchAgent Persistence via Masqueraded com.apple hcpi Property List
Suspicious ClickLock LaunchAgent Persistence Plist Creation (via file_event)
LaunchAgent or LaunchDaemon Persistence File Creation on macOS (via file_event)
Suspicious osascript LaunchAgent Plist Persistence for PhantomPulse on macOS
Pivot detection · T1543.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.