Suspicious Outlook Process Spawning Network Utilities for NotDoor C2 (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-11
Updated
2026-10-11

ATT&CK techniques

C2 → Exfiltration
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the Outlook process spawning nslookup or curl, behavior used by the NotDoor backdoor to exfiltrate the username through DNS lookups and HTTP requests to attacker infrastructure. Outlook does not normally launch these command line network utilities.

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Suspicious Outlook Process Spawning Network Utilities for NotDoor C2 (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1041 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.