Suspicious Payload Staging in ProgramData IntelDriver Folder (via file_event)

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
- T1055Process Injection
Defense Evasion
- T1027Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1055Process Injection
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of an encrypted shellcode container named boot64x.w inside an IntelDriver directory under ProgramData. The Dead#Vax campaign staged its AsyncRAT shellcode at this path before process injection.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious Payload Staging in ProgramData IntelDriver Folder (via file_event)

Pivot detection · T1027 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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