Suspicious PolarEdge Backdoor C2 URL with Module and putdata Command (via proxy)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-26
Updated
2026-10-26

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects requests to the PolarEdge backdoor command and control URL that carries module and cmd putdata parameters. The ORB network encodes the compromised device model and operation such as CISCO_3 in the module value while cmd putdata signals data upload. This structured URI pattern is specific to the PolarEdge implant and reveals active C2 communication.

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Suspicious PolarEdge Backdoor C2 URL with Module and putdata Command (via proxy)
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.