Suspicious PowerShell Loader Spawned by mshta via UNC5142 ClickFix

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-12
Updated
2026-10-12

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects mshta.exe spawning powershell.exe as observed in UNC5142 EtherHiding campaigns where an HTA disguised as an XLL launches an in-memory VIDAR or LUMMAC.V2 loader. Attackers abuse this chain to execute stager code from a fake browser update lure while evading disk based detection.

Related detections9 linkedT1059.001 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Script Interpreter Spawned by mshta
Malicious mshta Spawning PowerShell Loader via ClickFix
Malicious Forfiles Proxy Execution Launching PowerShell and MSHTA in PEAKLIGHT Chain (via process_creation)
Malicious ClickFix PowerShell Launching mshta with Remote URL (via process_creation)
Suspicious PowerShell Query of MSHTA Application Class in PEAKLIGHT Chain (via ps_script)
Windows: PowerShell-triggered HTA retrieval and execution with registry and process disruption
Suspicious ClickFix Clipboard PowerShell Execution from Run Dialog
Suspicious PEAKLIGHT Memory-Only PowerShell Downloader Flags (via process_creation)
Malicious Active Directory ACL Manipulation via PowerView
Suspicious PowerShell Loader Spawned by mshta via UNC5142 ClickFix
Pivot detection · T1059.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.