Suspicious PowerShell Query of MSHTA Application Class in PEAKLIGHT Chain (via ps_script)

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059.001PowerShell
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1218.005Mshta
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects PowerShell reading the registry Applications key for mshta under the software classes hive using wildcarded paths, a lookup PEAKLIGHT performs to locate mshta for proxy execution. Programmatic resolution of the mshta binary path is an anti-analysis and living-off-the-land staging behavior.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1059.001 — drag to rearrange

Malicious Forfiles Proxy Execution Launching PowerShell and MSHTA in PEAKLIGHT Chain (via process_creation)

Malicious ClickFix PowerShell Launching mshta with Remote URL (via process_creation)

Windows: PowerShell-triggered HTA retrieval and execution with registry and process disruption

Suspicious Scheduled Task Running PowerShell Every Minute (via process_creation)

Malicious Script Host Spawning PowerShell With Invoke-Expression (via process_creation)

Suspicious MSHTA VBScript WScript Shell Execution

Suspicious Remote HTA Payload Execution via MSHTA

Hidden PowerShell Archive Extraction via ExtractToDirectory

CastleLoader ClickFix PowerShell Hex Decode and Re-Execution

Suspicious PowerShell Query of MSHTA Application Class in PEAKLIGHT Chain (via ps_script)

Pivot detection · T1059.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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