Suspicious PowerShell Spawned by Windows Script Host from HTML Smuggling (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-08
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects PowerShell launched by wscript or cscript, matching the IcedID chain where HTML smuggling dropped a Windows Script File that ran VBScript and then PowerShell. The PowerShell stage downloaded and executed the IcedID loader.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.