Suspicious PowerShell WebClient DownloadFile with Execution Policy Bypass (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-28
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects PowerShell launched with an execution policy bypass and a hidden window that instantiates Net.WebClient to call DownloadFile. This behavior was observed in the updated MATA campaign against industrial companies to stage additional payloads onto compromised hosts. Detecting this scripted download surfaces the ingress-tool-transfer stage of the intrusion.

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Pivot detection · T1059.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.